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1. Introduction 
As limit order market systems are becoming pervasively adopted in a wide set 
of asset classes across a variety of financial markets, many studies have begun to 
investigate the ordering behaviors of traders in the various stock exchanges: Biais, 
Hillion, and Spatt (1995) on the Paris Bourse; Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) and Yao 
(2005) on the New York Stock Exchange; Hasbrouck and Sarr (2002) on the Island 
ECN of the NASDAQ Exchange; Ahn, Bae, Chan (2001) on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange; and Hollifield, Miller, and Sandås (2004) on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
Similarly, as electronic broking systems have overtaken traditional systems, foreign 
exchange (FX) markets are now considered the most actively traded electronic 
limit-order markets in the world. In 2010, the daily average volume in the world FX 
market is 1,490 billion US dollars (USD) (The Triennial Central Bank Survey, BIS, 
2010) whereas the daily average volume in the NYSE Group is slightly greater than 3% 
of that figure, i.e., 47.5 billion USD (NYSE Statistical Archive). 
Reflecting widespread adoption of limit order systems in financial markets, 
theoretical studies have introduced dynamic models suitable for investigating limit 
order submissions and order book build-up. In seminal research on the dynamic limit 
order market, both Foucault (1999) and Parlour (1998) analyze how a trader chooses 
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between market and limit order. In contrast to these models, which are simplified to 
only two quotes, Hollifield et al. (2004), Foucault et al. (2005), and Rocu (2009) 
investigate the manner in which limit orders with a variety of quotes are submitted in a 
dynamic framework. In these models, traders face a tradeoff problem, i.e., choosing 
between non-execution risk and free-option (pickoff) risk. The increase in the 
availability of order data has also spurred many empirical investigations of order 
placement strategies in limit order markets1.  
An interesting phenomenon addressed in several empirical studies is the 
cancellation or revision of many submitted orders without an actual transaction. For 
example, Biasis et al. (1995) find that 20% of orders are canceled in the Paris Bourse, 
whereas Hasbrouck and Sarr (2002) find that 93% of limit orders on the INET are 
canceled. Cancellation rates are approximately 90% for EUR/USD in the EBS FX 
market in 2010, which is not surprising because traders in FX markets must adjust to 
rapidly changing market conditions. If a trader optimizes her order choices, such as 
market or limit order and quotes at order placement, she should also optimally choose 
her revision/cancellation behaviors in line with changing market conditions, such as bid 
and ask quotes and the order book. Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (2002), Liu (2009), and 
                                                  
1
 See, for example, Biais et al. (1995), Hollifield et al. (2004), and Fong and Liu (2010). 
For more studies, see the literature review in section 2. 
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Fong and Liu (2010), among others, investigate revision/cancellation behaviors in stock 
markets. Unfortunately, this important aspect of order strategy has not been rigorously 
investigated in the literature. 
Moreover, the cancellation/revision behaviors in the FX market—the largest 
financial market—have not been examined. In this paper, we employ a unique dataset of 
limit orders in FX markets to characterize the behavioral characteristics of individual 
limit orders. In particular, we examine all individual orders submitted to the EBS FX 
market over five consecutive business days and investigate which environments force 
individual orders to exit from the market before entering a transaction2.  
As an important new contribution to the literature on quote revisions and 
cancellations in limit order markets, we measure how long individual orders remain in 
the market until they are revised or canceled, similar to Hollifield et al. (2004). The 
present study is the first study of FX markets to measure how long individual orders 
remain at the market. In particular, we compute the lifetime—defined as the time period 
in which an individual order remains active in the market—from the EBS complete 
order dataset for five consecutive days in September 2010.  
Due to the pervasive use of algorithmic trading in FX markets, a large portion 
                                                  
2
 Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer (2013) also use the EBS dataset in their 
empirical study, but the aim of their paper—investigating the liquidity risk in foreign 
exchange markets—is different from ours.. 
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of the measured lifetime of limit orders fall within fractions of seconds. To wit, 33.5% 
of all limit orders in the five-day sample are canceled (or revised) within one second. To 
prevent algorithmic trading from biasing the estimated results, the regression sample is 
restricted to include only those limit orders with lifetimes that are greater than or equal 
to two seconds. A robustness check using the same sample that includes all orders 
confirms that the results remain qualitatively similar.  
As with theoretical models of order placement strategy, we argue that order exit 
strategies should respond to the order book. Moreover, the critical determinant of exit 
decisions is a change in the order book after a limit order is placed in the market. We 
constructed two variables for order book changes: 1) a change in the best price with 
respect to the submitted quote and 2) a change in the depth of the quotes that have 
higher price priorities than the submitted quote.  
Both change variables appear to capture a deterioration of execution probability, 
which is the key parameter in determining whether and at what quote a trader will 
submit his limit order. However, after controlling for changes in depth, a mere change in 
the market price may not indicate a deteriorating execution probability because what 
matters is the waiting number in line. In fact, we find that the impacts of the two change 
variables on lifetime have opposite signs. By examining the most paired major 
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currencies in FX markets, EUR/USD, we find that an increased change in depth leads to 
faster cancellations of limit orders, whereas limit orders remain longer in the order book 
when the market price moves away from their quotes.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we 
review the literature on limit order markets and connect limit order strategies with 
cancellation behaviors. Section 3 presents in a simple analytical framework how order 
placement and order cancellation are similarly determined by traders’ optimizing 
behavior. Section 4 discusses the specific features of the EBS dataset and describes how 
FX markets operate at the microstructure level; in addition, this section presents the 
descriptive statistics for the lifetime variable and other covariates. Section 5 describes 
the lifetime estimation model and the empirical results. In section 6, we show that the 
qualitative nature of the results remains robust regardless of alternative model 
specifications. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review: limit order placement, cancellations, and quote revisions 
In early microstructure models, limit orders are considered a passive trading 
strategy that provides liquidity to a market. Limit orders are more costly than market 
orders because of non-execution risk and free option risk (or free trading option risk), as 
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tested empirically by Fong and Liu (2010). Non-execution risk arises because limit 
orders accumulate to constitute an order book, and an individual limit order may not be 
executed unless it becomes the best quote (Hasbrouck and Sarr, 2002; and Liu, 2009). 
By contrast, a market order is executed instantly with a limit order at the counter-side 
best quote in the order book. The free option risk arises for limit orders because a trader 
with private information only submits a market order when the market price offers a fair 
or a better quote (Copeland and Galai, 1983). For recent models with a dynamic 
structure, however, limit orders are preferred as an active trading strategy, Foucault 
(1999), Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005), and Rosu (2009).  
Fong and Liu (2010) argue that non-execution risk and free-option risk are two 
compelling reasons to cancel or revise limit orders. High rates of limit order 
cancellation/revision are common in stock markets; Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), 
Harris and Hasbrouck (1996), Hasbrouck and Sarr (2002), Hollifield, Miller, and Sandås 
(2004), and Yao (2005). Biais et al. (1995) was the first to investigate the order book of 
the limit order market at the Paris Bourse, which provides traders with the best five 
quotes and the corresponding volumes at each new order and cancellation; this 
investigation revealed that approximately 20% of orders (at the best five quotes) are 
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canceled3. Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) document that 56.2% of limit orders on the 
New York Stock Exchange remain unfilled. However, this figure should not be 
interpreted as active cancellation because some limit orders simply remain unmatched 
even at the close of the market. Using the complete tick data for a company on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange, Hollifield et al. (2004) report that the execution probability 
for two days is 68, 33, and 12% for limit orders that are 1, 2, and 3 ticks away from the 
best quote, respectively. Eventually, 88% of limit orders with prices that are 3 ticks 
away from the best quote are canceled. Yeo (2005) reports that the ratio of cancellations 
to submitted limit orders on the New York Stock Exchange has recently increased to 
40%4. Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) show that roughly 25 (40)% of limit orders are 
canceled after two (ten) seconds on the Island ECN, which represented 11% of the 
trades on the NASDAQ exchange in 1999. 
What are the underlying features that drive the cancellation of so many orders? 
A number of studies offer several explanations, including order-splitting strategy, 
undercutting, volatility, and spread. Yeo (2005) argues that many canceled limit orders 
                                                  
3
 This percentage is calculated as the ratio between unconditional new orders and 
cancellations, as shown in Table III (p. 1670, Biais et al., 1995). 
4
 Yeo (2005) compares the percentage of cancellations in all submitted requests, which 
includes market orders, limit orders, and cancellations. Notably, this percentage has a 
maximum limit of 50% for cancellations because the number of cancellations cannot 
exceed the number of limit orders. Approximately 20% of orders became cancellations 
in 2001, compared with 5% in 1990.  
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can be attributed to order-splitting strategy and undercutting. Traders split orders in 
multiple submissions when they do not intend to disseminate their private information. 
This strategy results in multiple cancellations when traders revise their orders. In 
addition, traders who compete to undercut other traders must revise their prices 
frequently. The dynamic limit order market model developed by Foucault (1999) 
indicates that higher volatility leads to a lower fill rate. Thus, a lower fill rate can be 
interpreted as a higher probability of cancellation in the FX market because there is no 
specific closing time. Foucault et al. (2005) theoretically show that the average time to a 
transaction increases with the size of the spread. This result can be interpreted as 
indicating a lower fill rate at a fixed time interval during sporadic incoming orders. 
Microstructure models for FX markets are notable in the stock market literature. 
These models emphasize the importance of order flow because of its explanatory power 
with regard to exchange rate fluctuations. For example, Evans and Lyons (2002) assume 
that customers with private information initiate trades at the dealer’s quoted price. Then, 
as dealers trade with one another, the private information contained in customer orders 
materializes in the order flows at the interdealer stage. Thus, the interdealer order flows 
aggregate dispersed private information and affect exchange rate movements.  
However, the previous literature on the microstructure of FX markets faces two 
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difficult challenges. First, although theoretical models are at the microstructure level, 
empirical studies use only aggregate order flows at the daily frequency. Second, the 
models implicitly assume that all limit orders are completely transacted and do not 
address the prevalence of cancellations/revisions of limit orders. This assumption elides 
a substantial component of dealer behavior because limit orders that are 
canceled/revised without any transactions comprise more than 90% of all orders in EBS 
FX markets5. If the order flow (orders with realized transactions) transmits important 
information to dealers, what information do canceled orders convey to the market? The 
literature on FX markets has not addressed this issue. Our study attempts to answer this 
question through the use of empirical information on cancellation/revision of limit 
orders in FX markets. 
 
3. Optimal strategy for order submission and cancellation  
 In this section, following the research line that includes Hollifield et al. (2004), 
we provide a simple model for an optimal strategy for order submission and order 
cancellation. The aim of this section differs from that of Foucault (1999), Parlour (1998) 
                                                  
5
 The average cancellation/revision rate is 90.0% for the EUR/USD market and 91.8% 
for the JPY/USD market in our five-day sample from September 2010. Biais et al. 
(1995) report that only approximately 20% of orders are canceled in the Paris Bourse, 
but they only observe cancellations at the best five quotes. The smaller figure in their 
studies is due in part to the omission of cancellations outside of the best five quotes.  
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and other theoretical studies that provide a complete characterization of the order book 
as a market equilibrium. As our review indicated in the preceding section, theoretical 
models treat cancellation as either prohibited or enforced exogenously. We abstract from 
model specifications and leave functional forms unspecified. We emphasize that both 
order placement and order cancellation can be treated in a single framework. 
 A trader, i, must evaluate the common value of asset, V, and personal valuation, 
iσ , before arriving at the market. Gains accrue from trade due to the heterogeneity of 
personal valuation among traders. The common value of an asset is evaluated by 
observing the market. The order book is observable to all traders, represents the current 
accumulated stocks of past order placements, and yields the best bid and ask prices. Let 
Bt represent the information set of the order book at time t. By monitoring the market, a 
trader continues to compare the benefit of submitting his limit order with the benefit of 
staying out of the market. If the trader chooses to place an order at time t, his order 
submission includes a specific quote, itq , and positive amount of volume, itv . In terms 
of expected utility, this optimization problem can be shown as follows: 
 
)];,([maxarg)ˆ,ˆ( tititiitit BvquEvq =          (1) 
where ui () is a utility function of trader i and a variable with hat represents an optimal 
choice. Notably, the optimization in equation (1) does not necessarily lead to the same 
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outcome for different individuals because individuals may have different preferences 
and personal valuations. 
 Although we avoid focusing on a specific form of equation (1), an example of a 
buy limit order in the spirit of Foucault (1994) and Parlour (1998) is the following: 
{ }{ } ititittitittititi vqBVBvqBvquE ⋅−+⋅= σρ )(~),,()];,([ ,      (2) 
where ()ρ
 
is the execution probability, which is a function of the submitted quote, 
volume, and order book. ()~V is an estimated value of V and is a function of order book. 
Liu (2009) extends the model using individual monitoring costs, which generates 
another source of heterogeneous responses of traders. The trader must estimate the 
uncertainty of the common value of asset V using the order book information, Bt. The 
solution for the dynamic equilibrium requires solving for the execution probability 
function at a game-theoretic equilibrium, but we neglect that task and instead focus on 
the optimal behaviors of order placement and order exit6.  
 If a trader chooses to place an order at time t, itvˆ > 0, and we label this 
submission time )(it s . Note that before entering the market, the order volume is zero, 
i.e., itvˆ = 0 for all )(itt s≤ . This part of the order strategy is order placement and is 
                                                  
6
 We are fully aware that it would not be possible to obtain the equilibrium solution 
with this degree of complexity introduced in the model. One issue is the timing of 
arrival to the market. Even in the order placement literature, arrival rates are 
exogenously given for other incoming traders. 
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thoroughly investigated in both theoretical and empirical studies. However, the order 
book changes after )(it s , and the trader may find it best at some time t’ not to keep an 
order in the market and to therefore cancel the order. We label this cancellation time as 
)(it e . The time framework labeled with decision making is shown in Figure 1. 
{Insert Figure 1} 
 The optimization problem in equation (1) can be simplified if a trader chooses 
between ordering (with a specific quote and volume) and not ordering. The following 
two inequalities hold for a canceled order: 
)];0,([)];,([ tititititi BquEBvquE >  at the time of order placement, t = )(it s ,       (3) 
)];,([)];0,([
''''' titit
i
tit
i BvquEBquE >
 at the time of order cancellation, t’ = )(it e .    (4) 
 From the two inequalities, we can deduce some relevant issues for empirical 
modeling. For explanatory variables, it is clear that changes in the order book, i.e., 
tttt BBB −=∆ '', , lead to alternative decision outcomes. Traders respond to the change in 
market conditions, including depth at each tick and best quotes on both sides. There are 
a few candidates for dependent variables. First, the volume change,
',titv∆ , is always - itv
 
because partial cancellation is not allowed in the EBS system. Using this information 
will lead to biased results, and we will not pursue this course. Second, the time elapsed 
between order placement and cancellations, )()( itit se − , can be measured by the time 
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stamp attached to all order submissions. We refer to this time span as the “lifetime”. 
Finally, if our dataset can provide a link between the original order and a resubmitted 
order at a later time, we can also compare the change in quotes, tttt qqq −=∆ '', . 
Unfortunately, the EBS dataset in this study does not permit this analysis. 
 What are the effects of a change in order book on lifetime? In this paper, we 
particularly focus on the two dimensions of order book: Quote change and depth (at 
quotes with price priority) change. An increase in depth (at quotes with price priority) is 
induced by other orders cutting in line and as a result waiting cue becomes longer. This 
decreases the execution probability in equation (2) and, therefore, the expected utility of 
the submitted order. Consequently, no order (= cancellation) may become the 
optimizing choice. In terms of lifetime, an increase in depth should lead to an earlier 
exit. 
 On contrary, an increase (decrease) in the best bid (offer) signals an increase 
(decrease) in the common value, V, and therefore increases the expected utility. It 
should be noted that this price change must not accommodate depth change discussed in 
the paragraph just above. A pure price change (not accommodating depth change) deters 
the second inequality to hold and, therefore, lengthens the lifetime of the submitted 
order. 
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 The traders’ types can be deduced by comparing the different strategies of 
traders responding to the same order book, B. If 
⋅⋅
> ji qq ˆˆ
 
holds for two traders i and j 
for the same B (depth, bid and ask), then trader i is more patient (impatient) for a sell 
(buy) order. A higher volume indicates liquidity traders because traders have stronger 
demand for transactions. A general trading strategy consists of choosing quotes and 
volumes after processing information such as order flows and outstanding orders from 
the market, which are dependent on a trader’s preferences or valuations and waiting or 
monitoring costs. By analogy to revealed preference in microeconomics, studying the 
placement of a quote with respect to the best quote should reveal traders’ characteristics. 
 
4. Limit orders at the EBS and the construction of variables 
After a limit order is submitted to the market by a dealer, the order waits to be 
hit by other dealers for a transaction to occur. The outcome of a limit order can be 
classified into three categories: (1) the total volume of the limit order is filled by a 
transaction(s); (2) the limit order is canceled before a transaction is realized; and (3) the 
limit order is withdrawn after part of the volume ordered is transacted.  
Traders can either initiate a quote (i.e., submit a limit order) or transact at a 
posted quote (i.e., submit a market order). In the EBS dataset, all data entries are 
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assigned one of five indicators: QS, QD, HS, HAD, and DSM. A quote begins with QS 
and a specific 20-digit ID and ends with QD. A hit begins with HS and ends with HAD. 
When two parties are matched in a transaction, DSM records the information related to 
the transaction. The outcome of a quote can be described by the four cases shown in 
Figure 2: (1) the quote is deleted by cancellation; (2) the quote is filled by either another 
quote or a market order; (3) the quote is canceled after part of the order is executed; or 
(4) the quote is filled by multiple transactions. We purchased the EBS dataset with a 
limited proprietary contract, and all data cannot be made public unless aggregated to 
conceal the characteristics of individual transactions. 
{Insert Figure 2 about here} 
 When submitted, each limit order is identified by a distinguishing 20-digit code 
with information on the side (i.e., bid or offer), volume, quote price, and the time stamp 
in a fraction of a second. The dataset also records all the market orders and transactions 
realized. Importantly, there are certain drawbacks to using the EBS dataset. A 20-digit 
ID is ascribed to each order-trader pair. Therefore, consecutive orders by the same trader 
receive randomized distinct IDs, and these orders cannot be connected. Unfortunately, a 
revised order cannot be distinguished from canceled orders. In the remainder of this 
paper, we treat all orders without a transaction as cancellations, although distinguishing 
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between (pure) cancellation and quote revision would provide a good research agenda if 
such a distinction becomes possible. 
Each limit order reappears in the dataset when all volume is exhausted by 
transactions with other dealers or when the order is canceled. A limit order is 
time-stamped when the order is placed and removed from the order book. The lifetime 
of limit orders is then calculated based on the difference between the two time stamps as 
shown in Figure 3. The lifetime we calculate in this study must be distinguished from 
the duration (i.e., what we call arrival lag in this study), which is measured by the time 
elapsed between two consecutive quotes, e.g., Manganelli (2005). 
{Insert Figure 3 about here} 
 Because of the data structure of this particular EBS database, in contrast to the 
(limited) book order dataset readily constructed by ICAP, we must reconstruct the entire 
order book by adjusting for each moment whenever a new submitted quote, a new 
transaction, or a new cancellation arrives to the market. By reconstructing the entire 
order book for the sample period, we can calculate the best bid, the best ask, and the 
bid-ask spread that corresponds to the time series at the incoming order frequency. 
Next, we ascribe the set of information from the EBS dataset with precise 
notations. For each limit order i, clock times are measured at the start of the order, ts(i), 
17 
 
and at the end of the order, te(i). The volume and quote are recorded as vit and qit. The 
best bid and ask are time-varying and are b(t) and o(t), respectively. Ii is an indicator 
function, taking the value of one for bid orders and zero for offer orders. The order book 
is maintained as the sum of the volume at the rate by each tick, i.e., 0.0001 EUR, on the 
bid and offer sides, bv(t, tick) and ov(t, tick), respectively 
 For this study, we use all orders submitted to the EUR/USD spot markets for 
five consecutive business days in September 2010, beginning with the 8th of September. 
In the following, we provide definitions of variables and their descriptive statistics later 
in the empirical section. These variables are classified into three groups: order 
characteristics, market conditions, and changes in priority.  
 
4-1. Order characteristics 
 The variables in the order characteristics group include lifetime (the dependent 
variable), order size, and distance from the best quote.  
Lifetime 
 As the dependent variable, we calculated the lifetime for each limit order using 
the following formula. 
 
)()( ititLife sei −=            (5) 
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Descriptive statistics for lifetime are also shown in Table 1. The EUR/USD lifetime 
distributions are heavily distorted toward zero. Although the mean values range from 
34.09 to 46.00 seconds, the median values range between 1.62 and 2.78. In the 
regression analysis, however, we restrict the sample as follows. First, we begin the 
sample from the 90th order because one of the explanatory variables requires at least 80 
preceding observations. Second, we exclude orders with a lifetime of less than 2 
seconds. Market orders are genuinely different from limit orders because market orders 
are intended for execution at the moment of submission, whereas a limit order trades off 
a non-execution risk for a better execution quote. In the regression analysis, market 
orders can be excluded by restricting the lifetime to greater than zero seconds.  
{Insert Table 1} 
Another concern is the order strategy pursued by algorithmic trading, which 
mechanically submits orders and makes cancellations in fractions of seconds. To 
analyze the rational response of (human) traders’ strategies, we set a threshold value for 
lifetime. However, it should be noted that we use all order data to construct the entire 
order book and extract the best market quotes from the constructed order book. We 
restrict the sample for the above reasons only in the regression analysis. 
The lifetime is described as the length of an arrow in Figure 3. As with the 
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magnitude of arrival lags discussed above, a large proportion of orders exit the market 
within a fraction of a second, making the lifetime heavily distributed toward zero. In 
fact, 23.5% of orders exit from the market in the 0.2–0.3 second lifetime bin in the 
EUR/USD market. Quote revisions or cancellations associated with the 0.2–0.3 second 
bin must be associated with computer-based or algorithmic trading. At the other extreme, 
orders with lifetimes exceeding 10 seconds also represent a large portion of all orders, 
27.5% of the EUR/USD market. 
 
Order size (Vol) 
With respect to the distribution of order sizes in the EUR/USD market, the 
most frequently used is the minimum size of one million USD (86.7%). From Table 1, 
we observe that volumes are almost always one million dollars. Even in the third 
quartile, volume is only one million dollars. The mean value of volume is greater than 
one million simply because approximately 15% of the orders are greater than one 
million dollars. In addition to the prominent role of the one-million-dollar order, the 
proportion of small orders is also notable. This clustering of small orders is consistent 
with the limit on open positions for traders (Cheung and Chinn, 2001). The limit on the 
intraday position for most dealers in the US is 50 million USD or less. In their survey, 
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Cheung and Chinn (2001) report that 54% (74%) of dealers are authorized to have a 
maximum open position of less than 25 (over 50) million USD. Orders exceeding 50 
million USD are exceptionally high with respect to the open position limits of most 
trading institutions.  
 Another interpretation of small orders, particularly for the skewed use of 
minimum one-million-dollar orders, is that currency traders tend to split their bulk 
orders to avoid an unfavorable effect on the market price based on Yeo’s (2005) 
arguments that an order splitting strategy will increase the cancellation rate. This type of 
strategy has been augmented in recent years by the use of algorithmic trading.  
 
Distance from the best quote (Gap) 
 Using quotes recorded in the original dataset and the constructed best-bid and 
best-offer price, we calculate the price gap, Gapi, between an individual quote and the 
best quote at the time of the order submission. This gap or distance should reflect the 
degree of the liquidity motive. If a dealer must have her submitted order executed 
quickly, this gap must be small or even negative in value. Biais et al. (1995) categorize 
market orders that must always be negative under our definition of Gap as aggressive 
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orders 7. By contrast, if a dealer expects her order to be placed at a more advantageous 
price with the risk of the transaction not occurring, this gap becomes large. 
 Formally, Gap is defined as 
{ }isiisii qitoIqitbIscaleGap −−+−≡ ))(()1())(( ,       (6) 
where scale takes a value of 10,000 for EUR/USD to make Gap represent the number of 
ticks. The mean value of Gap is two for the five-day sample in the EUR/USD market. 
We excluded orders with Gap greater than 50 ticks to prevent the regression results 
from being driven by a few absurdly high or low quotes. In fact, Gap is zero up to the 
1st quartile, 1 up to the median, and 2 or 3 up to the 3rd quartile. In other words, at least 
75% of orders are submitted within 4 ticks including the best market price.  
{Insert Figure 4 here} 
 In the theoretical section above, we indicated that the Gap of a limit order at 
entry reveals a trader’s characteristics. Placing an order at the market price or at a better 
quote yields a higher execution probability. Figure 4 decomposes limit orders by those 
executed and those canceled at distance from the best quote on September 8, 2010. This 
                                                  
7
 Biais et al. (1995) defines the first three categories for market orders and the other 
three for limit orders. Ranaldo (2004) investigates order placement decisions based on 
order aggressiveness, whereas Degryse et al. (2005) examine interactions between order 
aggressiveness and the order book. Rakowski and Beardsley (2008) examine 
less-aggressive limit orders behind the best quote. This paper also focuses on 
less-aggressive orders. 
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figure indicates that aggressive limit orders that improve the market price by one or two 
ticks are more likely to be executed than canceled. The number of executed limit orders 
is greater than the number of canceled limit orders at Gap = -2 or -1. However, limit 
orders placed at the market price have a greater likelihood of being canceled than being 
executed.  
{Insert Figure 5 here} 
 Figure 5 shows the mean and median lifetimes of both executed limit orders 
and canceled limit orders on September 8, 2010. In terms of lifetime, executed limit 
orders remain for a shorter time at the market than canceled orders at Gap = -2 or -1. At 
the market price, executed and canceled limit orders have approximately equivalent 
lifetimes. However, limit orders placed behind the market price have much longer 
lifetimes if executed. Limit orders on other days show the same features as those 
observed on September 8, 2010, in Figure 4 and 5. The statistical summary is presented 
in the appendix table.    
 
4-2. Changes in market conditions 
 As indicated in previous sections, cancellations/revisions should respond to 
changes in market conditions. Changes in market price—particularly when moving 
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away from a submitted quote—indicate a fall in a trader’s price priority in the order 
book. Additionally, a change in the volume of the order book, particularly those with 
higher price priority, increases the length of the queue for standing orders. Both of these 
changes affect the probability of execution of traders’ current orders and prompt traders 
to cancel or revise quotes.  
 
Best quote change ( ∆ Priority(Gap))  
 The first variable measures the change in the distance between the best quote 
and the submitted order.  
∆ Priority(Gap)i ≡  
{ }
{ }isiisi
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           (7) 
For example, a trader placed a limit buy order at one tick below the best bid. 
The execution probability depends on the standing orders at the best bid that have price 
priority to this limit buy order. The execution probability is further reduced when the 
best bid moves one tick upward. ∆ Priority(Gap) is (positive) one in this example. The 
effects of ∆ Priority(Gap) on lifetime are twofold. By reducing the execution 
probability, lifetime will be lengthened if the order is not canceled, ceteris paribus. 
However, a change in execution probability may lead to a different optimal behavior, 
and the order may be canceled immediately. 
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{Insert Table 2 here} 
 The basic statistical summary for ∆ Priority(Gap) is provided in Table 1. First, 
limit orders experience relatively large movements in market price in the extreme case. 
The market price moves toward limit orders by four ticks at the top (first) percentile, 
whereas limit orders at the 99th percentile experience the market price moving away by 
six or seven ticks. Limit orders in the middle percentile experience no change in market 
price. This lack of change in market price is also shown in Table 2. Approximately 54–
60% of canceled limit orders exit the market without observing a change in market 
price8. 
Change in depth with price priority ( ∆ Priority(Depth)) 
 The second variable is constructed from the change in depth. The depth 
relevant to an order includes those with price priority, i.e., those ahead in the queue. For 
a limit buy order i, this depth at the time of submission, )(it s , is represented by the 
following: 
 
{ }
∑
>∈ iqjj
s jitbv )),((
. 
                                                  
8
 This statement is actually too strong. We only observe Gap at the entry and exit, and 
the market price may have moved between these points of time. 
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 Notably, depth is counted only for volumes at quotes with higher price priority 
(j>qi) and excludes those at submitted quotes (j=qi). The reason for not including 
volumes at a submitted quote is that the change in volumes at this quote cannot be 
correctly associated with a change in price priority. As an obvious example, the volume 
at the submitting quote may remain unchanged although some orders with time priority, 
i.e., those orders submitted prior to this limit order, are canceled and the same amount of 
volume is placed after the limit order (coincidentally). To avoid this ambiguity, the 
definition in the following two equations omits the volume at the submitting quote.  
 In the following, we present two similar but alternative definitions for a change 
in depth between entry and exit. The first definition for ∆ Priority(Depth)i is referred to 
as ‘unconditional’ in equation (6), in which an indicator variable is used to control for 
the side. 
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







−−+








−
∑∑
∑∑
−
=
−
=
+=+=
0001.0
))((
0001.0
))((
))((
0001.0
))((
0001.0
)),(()),(()1(
)),(()),((
q
itoj
s
q
itoj
e
i
itb
qj
s
itb
qj
e
i
s
i
e
s
i
e
i
jitovjitovI
jitbvjitbvI
           (8) 
  With this definition, there is a high correlation between ∆ Priority(GAP) and 
∆ Priority(Depth) because a change in the best quote affects both variables in the same 
direction. Table 3 indicates that the correlation between ∆ Priority(GAP) and ∆
Priority(Depth) is approximately 0.7. The multicollinearity issue hinders the 
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simultaneous use of these variables in the regression. With respect to orthogonalization, 
we removed the factor induced by a change in the best quote from ∆ Priority(Depth). 
The orthogonalized version for EUR/USD is defined as follows. 
∆ Priority(Depth)i ≡
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 Figure 6 presents an illustrative example of a buy limit order submitted at 
1.0001. After placement of the order, three cases for the best bid are shown: the rising 
case in A, remaining unchanged in B, and the falling case in C. Both definitions in 
equations (8) and (9) exclude volumes at quote (1.0001) at which a limit order is 
submitted. In Figure 6, along with these definitions in (8) and (9), a modified version of 
the definition that includes volume at the quote (1.0001) at which a limit order is 
submitted is shown.  
 We now show in more detail how ∆ Priority(Depth) is calculated. For the case 
of an increase in the best bid of case A, the unconditional version in equation (8) 
accounts for a five-unit increase from six units to eleven units in depth. At the time of 
entry, two units at 1.0003 (best bid) and four units at 1.0002 sum to six units; note that 
the three units that are submitted at quote (1.0001) are not included. At the time of exit, 
three units at the new best bid (1.0004), three units at 1.0003, and five units at 1.0002 
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sum to eleven units. The orthogonalized version in equation (9) only counts volumes at 
the quotes that have non-zero depth both at entry and exit; therefore, it ignores an 
increase in volume at the new best bid (1.0004). Thus, the depth at entry is six, which is 
the same as in the unconditional definition, but the depth at exit is reduced to only eight 
units. The orthogonalized version of the definition ignores the effect of price changes on 
the depth. 
 Table 3 shows the correlation between ∆ Priority(GAP) and ∆
Priority(Depth). These correlations are sufficiently low to assure that multicollinearity 
does not appear to be a concern for the orthogonalized version defined in equation (9). 
{Insert Table 3} 
4-3. Control variables: market condition at entry 
 Market condition variables include market calmness (the reciprocal of 
volatility) and the overall size of the order book (i.e., not only those with price priority). 
 
Market volatility (Calm) 
 The arrival lag or duration, i.e., the elapsed time in seconds from the last order 
submission to a new order submission in the market, is calculated as follows.  
)1()( −−= ititlag ssi           (10) 
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Calculations of arrival lags and lifetime are depicted in Figure 3. For example, the 
arrival lag between order (i=3) and order (i=4) is t7 - t3. A large portion of orders are 
submitted literally within a fraction of a second following the preceding order in the 
market. The orders submitted within a second after the preceding order comprise 94.5% 
of orders on average for the five-day sample of two foreign spot markets9. In addition, 
approximately 1 percent of all orders are submitted simultaneously (measured in terms 
of milliseconds) with another order. This extremely fast speed of orders is explained in 
part by the pervasive use of algorithmic trading by computers10. The asymmetric 
information models in Easley and O’Hara (1987, 1992) suggest that large orders and 
short durations are evidence of trading by informed traders. Manganelli (2005) find 
supporting evidence for the link between short durations and trading by informed 
traders in the NYSE. We later introduce a new variable called CALM for representing 
the market conditions regarding the speed of activities by summing over the past several 
durations.  
To measure the calmness of the market, the time span for the previous Mth 
                                                  
9
 This ratio is slightly higher for the EUR/USD market than for the JPY/USD market 
due to the greater number of submissions in the former market. Simple averages are 
96.3 and 92.8% for EUR/USD and JPY/USD, respectively.   
10
 Corwin and Lipson (2011) distinguish program (algorithmic) traders, institutional 
traders, retail traders, and member traders in their empirical analysis on the NYSE-listed 
securities. See section 2 of their paper for the significant presence of program traders. 
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limit orders is calculated. This measure, Calmi, is proportionally the reciprocal of the 
number of limit orders within a fixed period. This measure increases as trading activity 
in the market slows. When the market is fast-paced, the decisions and responses of 
dealers must be accelerated.   
∑
+−=
≡
i
Mij
ji lagMCalm
1
)_1(               (11) 
where )1()( −−= jtjtlag ssj .  
 
Size of the order book (depth) 
 Using the constructed order book, we aggregate the volume of standing orders 
within N ticks, i.e., 0.0001*N USD, of the best price on both sides as a measure of 
market depth, Depthi. For EUR, we use 0.001 EUR as 1 tick. The market depth should 
affect the behavior of dealers, particularly regarding the timing of canceling a submitted 
order.  
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Increasing N allows one to investigate how far from the best quote cumulated orders in 
the order book can significantly affect a new incoming order. 
  
5. Lifetime estimation model and results 
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The change in market conditions affects the decision to exit from the order 
book and therefore the length of the lifetime. Using the market condition variables 
defined in the previous section, we evaluate the impact of a change—in terms of price 
and depth—in the order book on how long a limit order remains in the market.  
 In terms of selecting explanatory variables, most previous studies focus on 
order placement and include only variables observable at the time of order placement. 
However, our focus in this paper is order exit or cancellations, and thus the variables of 
interest should be those observable at the time of exit. To be more precise, a trader 
makes an entrance by observing the order book at the time of entry and then decides to 
exit from the market because of changes in the order book that have occurred between 
the time of entry and the time of exit. Therefore, the important measures are those 
variables that capture changes observed during the order’s stay at the market. These 
variables include ∆ Priority(Gap) defined in equation (7) and ∆ Priority(Depth) 
defined in equation (9).  
 In addition, we include those variables that represent the trader’s characteristics. 
First, a patient trader is more likely to place a limit order behind the best quote; such an 
order consequently has a greater value of Gap, which is the distance between the trader 
quote and the best quote in the market. The lifetime is expected to be longer for a 
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greater Gap regardless of whether the order is executed or canceled. This correlation 
appears as an upward slope of mean (median) lifetime in Figure 5. Second, FX dealers 
constantly serve their customers and often must meet customer demand by transacting 
in the interbank limit order market. In this case, Vol is greater—if it is not breaking 
down the block order—as it is reflecting the liquidity trading of dealers. However, 
liquidity trading itself does not directly relate to the degree of the urge to execute. The 
unconditional correlation between Vol and Gap is very low, ranging from -0.010 to 
0.002 in our sample. The sign of Vol is left open as an empirical question. With these 
explanatory variables, we estimate the following equation for the lifetime of limit orders 
in the EBS EUR/USD market: 
iiiiii VolGapGappriorityDepthpriorityLife εγγββα +++∆+∆+= 2121 )()( .    (13) 
where ∆ Priority(Depth) is the change in depth at better quotes, ∆ Priority(Gap) is the 
change in the market price, Gap is the distance measured in ticks between the market 
price and the submitted quote, Vol is the volume of a limit order, and iε  is an error 
term.  
Some cautionary measures taken during data constructions must be explained 
here. First, the first set of limit orders is removed from the estimation sample because 
the order book is reconstructed from the limit order submission database and may be 
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incomplete for orders appearing early in the database. In particular, the set of the first 
500 orders are only used to reconstruct the order book for later order placements, and 
the best bid and ask quotes are recovered from the constructed order book. Second, 
orders with quotes far from market price are removed. These orders may represent 
simply mispricing or strategic order submission but may inappropriately influence the 
regression result. Specifically, orders with quotes placed 50 ticks from the best quote at 
the time of submission are dropped from the regression sample. Finally, to minimize the 
effects of algorithmic trading, which may be operated with a completely different 
objective, orders with lifetimes of less than two seconds are removed from the 
regression sample. After performing this data cleaning, the basic lifetime regressions 
with four independent variables are estimated for both EUR/USD market for the five 
consecutive business days in our September 2010 sample. 
 
5-1. Empirical results of basic lifetime regressions 
 The estimation results may be biased if orders of algorithmic trading are 
retained in the sample because they have much shorter lifetimes and may differ in the 
objectives of their order strategies. Thus, we investigate the empirical model of equation 
(11) using only limit orders with lifetimes greater than or equal to 2 seconds. Notably, 
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later in the robustness section, the qualitative results are shown not to be sensitive to the 
threshold value of 2 seconds. 
{Insert Table 4 about here} 
The estimation results for EUR/USD lifetime basic regressions are shown in 
Table 4. All estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
fitness of the regressions in terms of R2 is between 18 and 22%. We believe that these 
explanatory powers are not too low, given that we cannot match consecutive ordering by 
the same trader. Information on financial institution size and type, i.e., banks or hedge 
funds, should matter for the lifetimes of the limit orders. For example, Anand, 
Chakravarty, and Martell (2005) and Kaniel and Liu (2006) find that the likelihood of 
submitting limit orders over market orders differs between informed institutional 
investors and uninformed individual traders in the NYSE. Unfortunately, our database 
does not provide information regarding institutions. 
We first report the estimation results of the variables of order characteristics. 
Patience measured by order placement one tick away from the best quote is related to an 
extra stay of approximately a half-minute in the order book. A greater volume of a limit 
order is associated with longer lifetime. A limit order with an extra one million USD 
generally remains approximately ten seconds longer in the order book. 
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 We now turn to the results for change in market condition variables. An 
increase in ∆ Priority(Depth) indicates an increase in depth at the better quotes and 
hastens the exit from the market of limit orders with worse terms of quotes. Thus, when 
he observes more orders jumping in line in front of his position, a trader will reevaluate 
the execution probability of his order and will decide to cancel or revise his order. The 
impact of one unit (i.e., 100 million USD) of additional depth ranges from minus 1.83 
(September 14) to minus 5.52 seconds (September 10). Based on the sign proportion of 
∆ Priority(Depth) in Table 2, the lifetime of approximately 23% (26%) of limit orders is 
lengthened (shortened) by a change in depth. 
 When the market price moves away, i.e., when there are positive values of ∆
Priority(Gap), a limit order is likely to remain longer in the market. The impact on 
lifetime of one tick moving away from the market price is approximately 50–70 seconds. 
This result is consistent with a standard theoretical model as equation (2). An increase  
in the best bid  signals an increase in the common value, V, and therefore increases the 
expected utility of limit buy order. 
 Caution is required in directly interpreting this result. The coefficient of ∆
Priority(Gap) in Table 4 is the unconditional impact of a one-tick change in the gap on 
the lifetime of limit orders. However, as we have shown, limit orders differ greatly in 
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patience and liquidity urges. It is natural to assume that there is an impact of one tick 
change difference between a limit order placed at the best quote and another order 
placed three ticks away from the best quote.  
Indeed, the cancellation probability, i.e., the reciprocity of execution probability, 
is much higher when an order is placed far from the best quote. Table 5 shows the 
cancellation probability for each Gap level and each tick change in Gap. For example, 
on the 8th of September, faced with a market price that has moved away one tick, a limit 
order in the first column that improves the best quote has a cancellation probability of 
24%, whereas limit orders placed three ticks away from the best quote are all canceled. 
Understanding this stark difference in execution probability, FX dealers should behave 
differently when facing a change in the best quote according to the Gap at the time of 
submission. 
{Insert Table 5} 
The difference-in-depth variable reflects a change in price priority of a 
submitted limit order. The difference-in-gap variable, on the other hand, captures a 
change in the estimated common value of the traded asset. These effects on lifetime in 
response to price priority changes or the common value change are influenced by 
traders’ characteristics. We will examine these issues with traders’ characteristics more 
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carefully in the next section. 
 
5-2. Robustness checks 
 The estimated results above may be sensitive to alternative threshold values for 
lifetime and alternative definitions of the depth change variable. We address each of 
these issues in the following. 
 
Alternative threshold values for lifetime  
In the previous section, to exclude possible algorithmic trading, which might 
affect the results of lifetime regressions, we restricted the sample by using orders with 
lifetimes greater than or equal to the threshold value of two seconds. However, the 
results of lifetime regressions may be sensitive to the choice of threshold values. We set 
alternative threshold values of 0, 0.5, 1, and 5 seconds and re-run the lifetime 
regressions. Of course, the number of observations varies substantially because a large 
portion of orders clusters around these seconds. The estimated results are shown for the 
threshold values of zero and five seconds in Table 4. The estimated coefficients 
modestly remain at the same level regardless of the threshold values. Notably, the 
fitness of regression monotonically increases as the sample size is reduced by increasing 
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the value of the threshold. In support of our previous findings, this sensitivity analysis 
demonstrates that the qualitative results remain the same for alternative threshold 
values. 
{Insert Table 6 about here} 
 
Alternative definition for depth change 
 As we discussed above in section 4.2, we exclude the volume at the submitted 
quote in the construction of the ∆ Priority(Depth) variable because of its ambiguity 
with regard to a change in price priority. Alternatively, we construct the ∆
Priority(Depth) variable by including the volume at the submitted quote, and the 
estimated results are reported in Table 7. ∆ Priority(Gap) and Gap show almost no 
change. The estimated coefficients of ∆ Priority(Depth) variable in general decrease 
approximately 30% compared to the results in Table 4, whereas point estimates of Vol 
increase 20–40%. As expected, including volume at the submitted quote undermines the 
impact of changes in depth that have ‘price priority’.  
{Insert Table 7 about here} 
 
6. Extended Lifetime Regression with Order Characteristics and Market 
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Conditions 
Thus far, the lifetime regression model for the limit order lifetime assumes that 
the effects of changes in the order book are homogeneous on all orders regardless of 
possible differences in patience or liquidity urges among traders. For example, a patient 
trader (or order) should respond differently to a change in the corresponding best quote. 
Thus far, we find that a limit order remains longer in the order book when the best price 
moves away, i.e., with positive ∆ Priority(Gap). However, it cannot be determined a 
priori whether an impatient order stays longer in the order book relative to a patient 
order when the best price moves away. An impatient order placed closer to the best price 
is more sensitive to price changes and may leave the order book relatively quickly. By 
contrast, an impatient order with a higher execution probability at entry may have room 
for the best price to move away for a tick or two. In the absence of a concrete theoretical 
model, this remains an entirely empirical question. 
 
6-1. Empirical results of the extended lifetime regression 
A straightforward means of evaluating the heterogeneous responses of orders is 
to interact an order’s characteristics with the variables of interest. We therefore 
re-estimate a lifetime equation by adding change-in-book variables interacted with 
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control variables. 
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where jiX is the j-th control variable. The control variables include two variables for 
order characteristics and two variables for market conditions at entry. The order 
characteristic variables are volume (Vol) and the difference between the order quote and 
the best quote in the order book (Gap). The market condition variables are the inflow 
speed of the preceding orders (Calm) and the subtotal volume in the order book (Depth). 
All variables are defined above in section 4. 
{Insert Table 8 here} 
The estimated results are shown in Table 8. First, the improvements in the 
fitness of regression are fairly substantial. In terms of adjusted R-squared, they increase 
from two to fifteen points over the five-day sample. Second, we find weak evidence that 
the effect of depth change, ∆ Priority(Depth), on the lifetime of limit orders is 
heterogeneous. All four control variables are statistically significant on some of the 
sample days, but no variables are always statistically significant on all five days of the 
sample period. The point estimates of ∆ Priority(Depth) show a substantial decrease 
(an increase in absolute term). However, the marginal effect of an increase in depth on 
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lifetime now should be measured with jij Xδβ +1  for the j-th control variable. In this 
manner, the marginal effect of ∆ Priority(Depth) comes back close to the estimates of 
the basic regression reported in Table 4 because all jδ are estimated to be positive. 
Third, for the estimates of ∆ Priority(Gap) with interaction terms, we find 
stronger evidence that heterogeneity represented by the control variables, particularly 
Gap and Vol, influence marginal effects. Thus far, with the basic lifetime regression, we 
find that all trades, whether they are patient or impatient, remain longer in the market 
when the best price moves away. Now, the results in Table 8 offer additional insight on 
how a limit order is placed at and removed from the market. A relatively patient trader 
or a trader with low waiting costs or relatively mild personal valuation places an order 
far from the best quote. These orders actually respond more slowly to changes in market 
conditions and therefore exit more slowly from the market. 
 To quantify the degree of heterogeneity, the marginal effects are compared 
between the 25th and 75th percentile values of the control variables. For the following 
comparisons, the five-day averages of the control variables at each percentile are 
calculated from Table 1. The value of Gap at the 25th and 75th percentile is zero and 
three, respectively11. Therefore, the difference in lifetime associated with a market price 
                                                  
11 The five-day sample average is 0.2 for Gap, but here we rounded to use a discrete 
value. 
41 
 
change would be 5.19 to 14.6 seconds between orders placed at the best quote and those 
placed three ticks behind when the best price moves one tick away12. This additional 
lifetime is substantial considering that the median value of a lifetime is less than three 
seconds. We thus have evidence for an order exit strategy when the market price moves 
away: a patient trader who places his order a few ticks behind the best quote would wait 
longer for extra time, in addition to a longer lifetime of all orders caused by price 
moving away. 
 
6-2. Robustness checks 
 Thus far, we have estimated regressions by ordinary least squares because of 
asymptotic consistency if the error terms have an expected value of zero and bounded 
variances. However, non-normal distributed error terms bias the standard errors used for 
statistical significance in a small sample. The lifetime variable is bounded from below 
(zero or two seconds), and its error terms should be treated with caution. 
First, taking the natural logarithm of the lifetime makes the range of the 
dependent variable both negative and positive. The estimation results for lifetime in the 
natural logarithm are shown in appendix table A2. The estimated values of the 
                                                  
12
 The marginal effect of this interaction term at the 25th percentile is zero because Gap 
is zero. The smallest estimated coefficient of this interaction term is 1.73 for September 
9, and this value is multiplied by 3 for Gap at the 75th percentile to obtain 5.19. 
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coefficients differ widely because of a large shift in dependent variables. However, the 
qualitative results hold for the signs and statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients. The only difference appears with respect to the signs of the interaction 
terms for Gap. 
 Second, we applied Tobit regression for the truncated lifetime variable. By 
exploiting the truncated estimation model, orders with a lifetime of less than two 
seconds are truncated to zero instead of being dropped from the sample, which increases 
the number of observations. For example, for the 8th of September, the observations 
increase from 257,215 to 491,088. The Tobit estimated results are shown along the OLS 
results in appendix table A3. Again, the qualitative results remain intact. The expanded 
OLS result in Table A3 is qualitatively similar to the result presented in Table 8. 
Moreover, the OLS and Tobit results in Table A3 are quite similar. We conclude that the 
results of this research are robust regardless of the econometric specifications for error 
terms. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The EBS FX markets provide a unique platform to investigate the 
microstructure behavior of limit orders because the EBS dataset records all submitted 
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orders in time series. We reconstructed the order book and the best market quotes, both 
varying at the frequency of incoming orders. In addition, we measured the lifetime of all 
limit orders. Consistent with previous evidence on stock markets, the majority of orders 
in FX markets are also canceled (or resubmitted with a modified quote) before any 
transactions occur.  
Several features of individual orders in the EBS EUR/USD limit order market 
are notable. First, more than half of orders have lifetimes of less than three seconds. 
Second, approximately 85% of orders are submitted with a minimum size of one million 
USD. Third, submitted quotes are within three ticks from the best quote for 75% of all 
orders. 
Most previously developed theoretical models for a limit order market 
concentrate on order placement strategies by imposing exogenous restrictions on 
cancellation behavior. A simple model that encompasses both order placement and order 
exit suggests that order book information should affect a trader’s decision both at entry 
and exit. We test this proposition by estimating lifetime regressions by regressing the 
lifetime of limit orders on changes in the order book. The estimated results demonstrate 
that support lifetime is influenced by a change in the submitted-and-best quote gap and 
depth with a higher price priority. A greater distance between the submitted quote and 
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the best quote after order placement contributes to a longer lifetime in the order book. 
An increased depth of quotes with higher price priority shortens the lifetime of a 
submitted limit order. 
We further test whether individual order characteristics and market conditions 
(at the time of submitting a new order) affect the degree of the impact of the order book 
change on the lifetime of limit orders in the FX market. Consistent with the expected 
financial behaviors of market traders, we find that the response of the lifetime to order 
book depends on the characteristics of the order. In particular, for a change in the price 
gap, a patient order, which is defined as placed far from the best quote, leaves the 
market more slowly than an impatient order.  
 Whereas most previous studies focus on stock markets, this study contributes to 
the literature on limit order markets by offering empirical evidence from FX markets. 
Our suggested specifications for the estimation model for the lifetime of limit orders 
yield sufficient explanatory power and are robust to the selection of the cut-off level for 
a lifetime, to the specification of explanatory variables, and to various econometric 
methods. Kozhan and Salmon (2012) obtain negative results in seeking to determine 
whether the use of the information content of the order book in the US Dollar-British 
Pound Sterling market yields economically significant returns. Their results do not 
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contradict our results that a change in the order book affects the exit strategy of traders 
in FX markets. After the information from the order book is efficiently reflected in the 
market price via the exit strategies of market participants, there will be no extra profit 
remaining in the market, which is consistent with the assumptions of the efficient 
market hypothesis. 
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Figure 1. Decision making by an FX dealer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: qit and vit are the quote and the volume of submitted order i at time t. A trader 
observes market conditions (in the dotted square box) and submits his limit orders at 
ts(i) when the expected utility of placing an order exceeds that of staying out of the 
market. After order placement, a trader continues to monitor the market and decides to 
cancel his order at te(i) if staying out maximizes his expected utility. 
  
decision 
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order 
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Figure 2. Records of orders on the EBS spot market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: QS indicates the beginning of the order. QD indicates the end of the order. DSM 
indicates a transaction. There are four outcomes for an order: (1) the order is 
deleted by cancellation; (2) the order is filled with either another counter-side limit 
order or a market order; (3) the order is canceled after a part of the order is 
executed; or (4) the order is filled by multiple transactions. 
  
QS 
QD(0) 
DSM(x) QD(x) 
QD(x) 
DSM(y) 
(1) cancel 
(3) cancel 
(2) no order left 
QD(x+y) 
(4) no order left 
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Figure 3. An illustrative example of EBS limit order flows  
for arrival lags (duration) and lifetime 
 
time stamp ID EBS code Volume Side 
t1 i=1 QS 1,000,000 bid 
t2 i=2 QS 1,000,000 offer 
t3 i=3 QS 2,000,000 bid 
t4 i=2 QD 0 offer 
t5 i=1 QD 0 bid 
t6 i=3 QD 0 bid 
t7 i=4 QS 1,000,000 offer 
t8 i=4 QD 0 offer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For the top panel, see Figure 2 for the definitions of EBS code and dynamic flow 
charts. The bottom panel provides a graphical representation of this example. A circle at 
the left end of the arrow indicates the arrival of an order, and the right end of an arrow 
indicates the exit of the order. For example, the first order (i=1) arrives at the market at 
t1 and exits at t5. The arrival lag is the time elapsed between the previous order’s arrival 
and the current order’s arrival; for example, the arrival lag is t2 - t1, for the second order 
(i=2) and t7 – t1 for the fourth order (i=4). Lifetime is defined as t5 - t1, t4 – t2, t6 - t3, and 
t8 - t7 for the first through fourth order, respectively. 
 
  
t1   t2    t3   t4   t5   t6   t7           t8 
time 
i=1 
i=2 
i=3 
i=4 
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Figure 4. Execution probability 
 
Note: The number of observations (nob) for executed and canceled limit orders by Gap 
are represented by the line with square boxes and the line with triangles, respectively. 
The execution probability (on the right scale) is calculated by the nob of executed orders 
divided by the sum of executed and canceled orders. This figure represents the data for 
September 8, 2010, in appendix table A1. 
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Figure 5. Difference in lifetime between executed and canceled limit orders 
 
Note: Lifetimes of limit orders are shown by Gap. Lines with square boxes indicate 
executed limit orders, and lines with triangles indicate canceled orders. Solid 
(broken) lines indicate the mean (median). This figure represents the data for 
September 8, 2010, in appendix table A1. 
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Figure 6. Alternative definitions of change in depth  
case A (bid rises)    case B (bid remains the same) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
case C (bid falls)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         unconditional    unconditional      orthogonalized    orthogonalized 
     including       without             including       without 
   at-own quote     at-own quote       at-own quote      at-own quote 
 
case A    + 6  (9, 15)    +5  (6, 11)   +3  (9, 12)     +2  (6,  8) 
case B    +3  (9, 12)     +2  (6,  8)  +3  (9, 12)     +2  (6,  8) 
case C    -5  (9,  4)     -4  (6,  2)  -3  (7,  4)     -2  (4,  2) 
 
Note: This figure only accounts for a buy-limit order. The case for a sell-limit order can 
be shown by analogy. An asterisk (*) indicates one unit (one million USD). In all cases, 
the best bid (1.0003) and depth are the same for all quotes at order submission (left). 
The bottom panel shows the change in depth, and the depth at entry and at exit are 
shown in parentheses. The unconditional version of change in depth counts volumes at 
all quotes with price priority. The orthogonalized version of change in depth counts 
volumes only at quotes that have non-zero volume at both entry and exit.  
quote at entry          quote at exit 
1.0004   1,0004 *** 
1.0003 **  1,0003 *** 
1.0002 ****  1.0002 ***** 
1.0001 *** +  1.0001 ****  
1.0000 **  1.0000 ** 
0.9999   0.9999 
quote at entry          quote at exit 
1.0004   1,0004 
1.0003 **  1,0003 **** 
1.0002 ****  1.0002 **** 
1.0001 *** +  1.0001 **** 
1.0000 **  1.0000* 
0.9999   0.9999 
quote at entry          quote at exit 
1.0004   1,0004 
1.0003 **  1,0003 
1.0002 ****  1.0002 ** 
1.0001 *** +  1.0001 ** 
1.0000 **  1.0000 *** 
0.9999   0.9999 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of EUR/USD (five days in September 2010) 
 
Note: All orders regardless of cancellations or executions are used to construct the order 
book. The sample includes only canceled orders from the EUR/USD spot foreign 
exchange market. The first 500 observations are dropped from the regression sample. 
Orders with quotes placed more than 50 ticks away from the market quote are also 
dropped. Lifetime is measured as the time elapsed between entry to and exit from the 
market. ∆ Priority(Depth) is the change in depth at price-priority quotes and ∆
Priority(Gap) is the change in Gap. For the precise definitions, see section 4.  
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
NOB 491,092 436,339 408,244 434,997 551,952
lifetime mean 39.05 42.00 41.85 38.31 30.83
(seconds) min 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005
1% 0.248 0.249 0.248 0.247 0.246
25% 0.298 0.370 0.312 0.283 0.268
50% 2.32 2.95 2.57 2.21 1.70
75% 12.77 15.69 13.83 12.20 9.20
99% 563 634 618 652 452
max 37180 30704 36716 28032 30989
Δpriority(GAP) mean 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.21
(ticks) min -36 -39 -40 -46 -37
1% -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
25% 0 0 0 0 0
50% 0 0 0 0 0
75% 0 0 0 0 0
99% 7 7 6 6 7
max 84 75 97 107 179
Δpriority(DEPTH) mean 1 1 0 0 0
(million US dollars) min -1,008 -420 -517 -341 -955
1% -31 -30 -29 -30 -33
25% 0 -1 0 -1 0
50% 0 0 0 0 0
75% 1 1 1 1 1
99% 34 34 31 31 33
max 995 309 489 483 961
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Table 1. (continued)  
 
Note: (continued) VOL is the size of the order. GAP is the difference between the 
submitted quote and the best quote in the market. Depth is measured as aggregate 
volume in the order-book. Calm is calculated as the arrival lags between preceding and 
incoming orders. 
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
NOB 491,092 436,339 408,244 434,997 551,952
Vol mean 1.20 1.20 1.24 1.21 1.23
(million US dollars) min 1 1 1 1 1
1% 1 1 1 1 1
25% 1 1 1 1 1
50% 1 1 1 1 1
75% 1 1 1 1 1
99% 3 3 4 4 5
max 999 156 250 250 940
Gap mean 2 2 2 2 2
(ticks) min -2 -2 -9 -4 -4
1% -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
25% 0 1 0 0 0
50% 1 1 1 1 1
75% 3 3 3 3 3
99% 12 12 13 13 13
max 50 50 50 50 50
Depth(10) mean 299 271 289 324 296
(million US dollars) min 37 25 12 23 18
1% 141 111 113 89 92
25% 250 215 227 213 202
50% 303 265 277 297 295
75% 351 336 359 428 379
99% 480 459 510 639 603
max 1,328 722 839 911 1,570
Calm(40) mean 6.2 6.9 7.4 6.8 5.4
(seconds) min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1% 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
25% 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.0
50% 3.2 3.6 3.8 3.7 2.5
75% 6.8 7.7 8.3 8.2 6.1
99% 46 49 54 44 41
max 399 278 393 238 335
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Table 2. Direction of changes in Gap and Depth 
 
Note: Complementary to the information in Table 1, the proportions of negative change, 
no change, and positive change for change variables are shown. 
 
  
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
Δpriority(GAP) negative 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18
(ticks) zero 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.57
positive 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.24
Δpriority(DEPTH) negative 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22
(million US dollars) zero 0.53 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.52
positive 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.26
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Table 3. Correlation between ∆ Priority(Gap) and ∆ Priority(Depth) 
 
Note: ∆ Priority(Depth) is defined in equations (8) and (9). Equation (8) corresponds 
with the second row and equation (9) with the fourth row. The first and third rows are 
modified versions of ∆ Priority(Depth) that include depth at the submitted quote. 
 
  
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
Depth including at-own-quote 0.714 0.738 0.711 0.731 0.613
Depth without at-own-quote 0.746 0.761 0.733 0.752 0.635
Orthogonalized depth including -0.109 -0.088 -0.107 -0.069 -0.181
Orthogonalized depth without -0.108 -0.078 -0.105 -0.055 -0.176
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Table 4. EUR/USD Basic Lifetime Regressions (only with change variables)  
 
Note: All orders regardless of cancellations or executions are used to construct the order 
book. The sample includes only canceled orders from the EUR/USD spot foreign 
exchange market. The first 500 observations are dropped from the regression sample. 
Then, orders with lifetimes of less than two seconds are dropped as they may add noise 
to the analysis due to algorithmic trading. Orders with quotes placed more than 50 ticks 
away from the market quote are also dropped. Figures in parentheses are the standard 
deviations that are robust to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
Δpriority(DEPTH) -5.00*** -4.91*** -5.52*** -2.95*** -1.83***
(0.44) (0.43) (0.51) (0.49) (0.24)
Δpriority(GAP) 70.30*** 54.55*** 72.37*** 56.97*** 49.52***
(4.29) (3.96) (5.15) (4.44) (2.64)
GAP 49.98*** 37.50*** 44.33*** 35.62*** 36.12***
(2.39) (1.72) (2.21) (1.87) (1.73)
VOL 12.32*** 8.07*** 10.58*** 10.51*** 6.48***
(2.17) (1.24) (1.85) (1.41) (2.51)
constant -91.48*** -50.24*** -71.86*** -43.73*** -55.19***
(7.38) (5.11) (6.54) (5.31) (5.53)
R2 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.21
NOB 257,215 243,558 219,990 224,778 262,866
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Table 5. Cancellation probability by change in Gap and Gap at entry 
 
Note: Cancellation probabilities at each Gap by ∆ Priority(Gap) are shown. The figures 
in parentheses are the number of observations in the corresponding cell. 
8-Sep
change in gap -1 0 1 2 3
-3  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.631 (1,422)
-2  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.739 (4,921) 0.975 (3,893)
-1  (0)  (0) 0.892 (43,444) 0.987 (16,700) 0.995 (5,518)
0  (0) 0.814 (120,735) 0.985 (93,946) 0.996 (20,858) 0.998 (13,611)
1 0.242 (20,674) 0.960 (29,632) 0.990 (10,272) 0.999 (6,641) 1.000 (4,262)
2 0.740 (847) 0.981 (4,774) 0.998 (3,689) 0.999 (2,080) 1.000 (1,746)
3 0.776 (223) 0.980 (1,418) 0.993 (2,423) 0.998 (1,254) 1.000 (956)
9-Sep
change in gap -1 0 1 2 3
-3  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.626 (1,271)
-2  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.780 (4,775) 0.980 (3,533)
-1  (0)  (0) 0.900 (36,780) 0.988 (15,789) 0.997 (6,310)
0  (0) 0.783 (89,999) 0.986 (79,129) 0.997 (24,110) 0.999 (15,682)
1 0.246 (19,368) 0.959 (23,456) 0.993 (9,770) 1.000 (7,354) 1.000 (4,344)
2 0.720 (739) 0.986 (4,493) 1.000 (3,619) 1.000 (2,114) 1.000 (1,732)
3 0.841 (214) 0.988 (1,262) 0.999 (1,993) 0.999 (1,141) 1.000 (965)
10-Sep
change in gap -1 0 1 2 3
-3  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.646 (1,300)
-2  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.784 (4,319) 0.974 (3,186)
-1  (0)  (0) 0.900 (35,220) 0.984 (11,713) 0.996 (5,883)
0  (0) 0.808 (105,347) 0.984 (66,012) 0.994 (20,380) 0.999 (16,595)
1 0.242 (18,187) 0.955 (19,482) 0.990 (8,169) 1.000 (6,437) 0.999 (4,372)
2 0.742 (764) 0.977 (3,031) 0.998 (3,122) 1.000 (1,693) 0.999 (1,535)
3 0.749 (191) 0.992 (1,732) 0.998 (1,787) 1.000 (992) 1.000 (892)
13-Sep
change in gap -1 0 1 2 3
-3  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.648 (1,136)
-2  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.745 (3,743) 0.970 (2,946)
-1  (0)  (0) 0.892 (34,956) 0.983 (13,836) 0.997 (5,991)
0  (0) 0.798 (110,662) 0.985 (77,456) 0.995 (25,712) 0.997 (13,692)
1 0.222 (18,522) 0.952 (21,857) 0.994 (9,736) 0.999 (7,701) 1.000 (3,632)
2 0.735 (731) 0.978 (3,368) 0.996 (2,950) 0.999 (1,724) 1.000 (1,343)
3 0.780 (191) 0.986 (1,547) 0.999 (1,657) 1.000 (997) 1.000 (748)
14-Sep
change in gap -1 0 1 2 3
-3  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.632 (1,969)
-2  (0)  (0)  (0) 0.738 (6,270) 0.962 (4,526)
-1  (0)  (0) 0.864 (45,017) 0.976 (17,450) 0.994 (7,721)
0  (0) 0.787 (138,077) 0.979 (99,871) 0.990 (33,344) 0.997 (19,383)
1 0.219 (24,030) 0.947 (32,273) 0.985 (13,007) 0.998 (9,479) 0.999 (4,887)
2 0.706 (958) 0.970 (5,197) 0.991 (4,164) 0.998 (2,406) 0.999 (1,831)
3 0.802 (243) 0.977 (2,191) 0.995 (2,369) 0.998 (1,329) 0.999 (993)
gap at submission
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Table 6. EUR/USD Basic Lifetime Regressions (Robustness with thresholds) 
Lifetime >= 0 
 
 
 
Lifetime >= 5 
 
Note: Thresholds to exclude limit orders with short lifetimes are changed to zero and 
five seconds. The zero-second threshold includes the entire sample. See also the note for 
Table 4. 
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
Δpriority(Depth) -4.39*** -4.32*** -4.95*** -2.49*** -1.65***
(0.40) (0.41) (0.47) (0.45) (0.21)
Δpriority(Gap) 67.66*** 53.16*** 69.99*** 54.36*** 48.58***
(4.20) (3.85) (5.04) (4.32) (2.64)
Gap 29.80*** 25.71*** 26.63*** 17.23*** 19.79***
(1.44) (1.17) (1.35) (0.94) (0.95)
Vol 4.70*** 5.19*** 5.73*** 6.01*** 3.56***
(1.73) (0.69) (0.88) (0.86) (1.36)
constant -45.88*** -34.49*** -39.88*** -19.12*** -28.86***
(4.12) (3.10) (3.62) (2.75) (2.90)
R2 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.18
NOB 491,088 436,335 408,240 434,995 551,946
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
Δpriority(Depth) -5.16*** -5.31*** -6.00*** -3.15*** -1.81***
(0.47) (0.45) (0.55) (0.53) (0.26)
Δpriority(Gap) 71.69*** 55.28*** 73.54*** 58.37*** 50.08***
(4.34) (4.02) (5.19) (4.51) (2.65)
Gap 61.46*** 44.11*** 54.97*** 45.25*** 44.90***
(2.94) (2.04) (2.73) (2.38) (2.16)
Vol 21.21*** 9.46*** 14.56*** 12.14*** 11.95***
(3.99) (1.63) (3.07) (1.85) (2.68)
constant -123.31*** -56.48*** -91.91*** -54.54*** -73.98***
(10.36) (6.40) (8.70) (7.00) (7.12)
R2 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.23
NOB 187,749 181,552 161,966 163,726 184,483
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Table 7. EUR/USD Basic Lifetime Regressions 
(Robustness with alternative depth definition) 
 
Note: Modified version of equation (9) for ∆ Priority(Depth) that includes the depth at 
the submitted quote.  
 
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
Δpriority(Depth) -3.53*** -3.77*** -4.11*** -2.10*** -1.34***
(0.33) (0.33) (0.39) (0.37) (0.18)
Δpriority(Gap) 70.61*** 54.34*** 72.59*** 56.82*** 49.72***
(4.35) (3.99) (5.23) (4.46) (2.67)
Gap 50.22*** 37.28*** 44.61*** 35.68*** 36.24***
(2.40) (1.72) (2.23) (1.87) (1.73)
Vol 15.92*** 11.85*** 14.49*** 12.62*** 7.81***
(2.18) (1.31) (1.89) (1.42) (2.51)
constant -93.28*** -50.50*** -72.97*** -44.10*** -55.70***
(7.46) (5.16) (6.63) (5.34) (5.54)
R2 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.21
NOB 257,215 243,558 219,990 224,778 262,866
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Table 8. EUR/USD Extended Lifetime Regressions 
(with order characteristics and market conditions) 
 
Note: See notes for Table 4. 
8-Sep 9-Sep 10-Sep 13-Sep 14-Sep
Δpriority(DEPTH) -7.03*** -3.49* -9.27*** -7.41*** -7.97***
(0.98) (1.87) (1.31) (1.19) (0.94)
Δpriority(GAP) 40.34** 1.69 81.89*** 30.63*** 25.12***
(18.57) (14.17) (19.90) (9.70) (6.85)
Gap 40.02*** 34.99*** 38.53*** 31.56*** 31.14***
(2.59) (1.80) (2.27) (1.88) (1.62)
Vol 5.16** 2.81 4.26* 10.60*** 3.35*
(2.18) (2.36) (2.37) (1.70) (1.92)
Δpriority(Depth) interacted with
GAP 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.51*** 0.24***
(0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07)
VOL 0.89*** 0.08 0.01 -0.09 0.30
(0.26) (0.11) (0.03) (0.10) (0.20)
DEPTH 0.00*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CALM 0.18* 0.15 0.24*** 0.12 0.31***
(0.09) (0.17) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Δpriority(Gap) interacted with
GAP 4.09*** 1.73* 4.62*** 4.87*** 2.22***
(0.92) (1.03) (1.09) (1.14) (0.22)
VOL 10.44*** 8.96*** 7.40*** 0.12 3.00***
(2.34) (2.83) (1.84) (0.90) (0.99)
DEPTH -0.10* 0.09* -0.19*** -0.01 -0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
CALM 1.77*** 0.64 -0.37 0.49 1.28***
(0.24) (0.70) (0.60) (0.32) (0.46)
constant -46.93*** -35.37*** -39.14*** -25.76*** -29.98***
(7.83) (6.09) (6.90) (5.74) (4.52)
R2 0.37 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.27
NOB 257,215 243,558 219,990 224,778 262,866
63 
 
Appendix Tables 
A1. Lifetime by Gap for executed and canceled limit orders 
 
Note: Lifetimes decomposed by Gap are shown for executed and canceled limit orders. 
Along the mean and median, lifetime at the 95th and 99th percentiles are shown. 
 
gap nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std gap nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std
-2 1769 0.03 0.80 13.28 0.62 5.37 -2 13 0.63 25.32 25.32 4.07 7.63
-1 15988 0.16 16.21 82.53 5.38 59.01 -1 6037 1.00 75.72 378.15 19.42 89.83
0 23820 2.09 56.01 235.99 15.62 88.10 0 136441 1.24 61.51 304.35 16.96 86.27
1 6315 7.12 200.50 716.38 46.44 173.43 1 153217 2.13 98.65 385.01 23.57 122.31
2 1615 31.12 520.57 1324.52 119.46 372.01 2 52464 3.53 94.70 348.59 24.90 150.08
3 675 67.78 1092.11 1996.72 223.62 487.47 3 31540 4.76 131.07 459.82 33.88 183.76
4 482 107.36 1158.27 2488.23 275.36 481.01 4 23616 6.17 157.48 554.00 40.47 174.80
5 323 169.55 1834.43 5005.62 432.01 789.85 5 17514 5.15 181.22 633.13 44.82 264.88
nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std
-2 1409 0.08 1.37 14.75 0.81 8.14 -2 8 2.33 16.11 16.11 6.13 6.84
-1 14877 0.15 15.43 88.34 5.21 85.69 -1 5685 1.00 72.31 280.50 16.97 98.87
0 20593 2.32 56.25 248.98 16.25 78.16 0 101635 1.62 82.10 371.18 20.86 127.11
1 4862 8.59 252.38 851.06 57.79 183.48 1 131485 2.82 114.40 438.09 27.69 155.58
2 1325 34.60 508.23 1634.88 122.86 313.10 2 55631 3.80 101.99 375.78 26.16 123.42
3 578 66.44 920.25 1945.79 220.44 522.23 3 33966 4.44 118.22 424.89 31.19 186.46
4 372 115.25 1133.03 3497.84 302.23 727.08 4 26519 4.58 143.77 491.81 35.64 164.60
5 236 170.73 1565.86 2963.40 369.30 688.28 5 23392 3.89 181.74 649.15 46.00 252.48
nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std
-2 1299 0.08 2.80 21.55 1.14 9.14 -2 34 2.83 446.35 815.82 45.85 156.46
-1 14073 0.15 19.14 101.90 6.22 61.58 -1 5322 1.03 77.60 459.50 22.87 127.75
0 21198 2.38 69.51 285.62 18.34 126.33 0 111200 1.51 79.79 386.09 20.47 97.42
1 4701 8.25 231.84 821.32 56.19 229.88 1 113787 2.77 119.49 442.89 27.59 113.99
2 1260 36.45 571.25 1459.12 133.28 370.76 2 45667 3.58 112.28 365.59 27.69 137.56
3 582 83.81 945.46 2226.25 226.51 433.22 3 33777 3.59 127.44 442.12 31.44 145.10
4 339 149.66 1153.29 5654.73 359.62 864.88 4 25353 4.28 148.89 479.88 35.47 158.67
5 232 143.93 1276.88 2503.16 367.26 589.52 5 16238 4.01 183.92 623.58 44.69 230.27
nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std
-2 1298 0.08 1.53 33.26 1.66 17.88 -2 22 1.23 40.93 43.23 9.46 15.27
-1 14683 0.16 16.43 90.07 5.76 93.51 -1 4957 0.96 66.00 347.17 17.71 80.15
0 23557 2.47 66.28 296.51 18.50 102.55 0 116328 1.45 69.57 426.46 20.46 104.13
1 5043 8.36 245.89 860.85 63.70 393.05 1 125535 2.40 106.36 429.20 26.07 116.38
2 1335 33.76 530.56 1763.92 137.15 411.41 2 53546 3.28 95.50 349.18 24.43 125.32
3 554 87.88 983.70 2710.94 255.26 709.78 3 29568 4.50 156.81 658.35 39.20 159.73
4 304 151.58 1462.66 6612.84 470.74 1614.12 4 20875 5.40 195.29 701.63 47.58 238.27
5 220 225.77 2275.61 3591.07 506.10 739.78 5 21290 2.92 179.86 628.22 43.12 284.51
nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std nob median 0.95 0.99 mean std
-2 1991 0.02 0.75 6.25 0.57 5.91 -2 13 1.38 37.08 37.08 5.70 10.51
-1 19174 0.11 11.83 69.26 4.57 128.15 -1 6369 0.77 58.15 327.50 16.82 87.40
0 31342 1.48 50.31 221.39 14.36 98.14 0 150440 1.10 53.56 257.21 14.88 90.04
1 8430 5.45 163.12 655.87 41.28 183.07 1 161860 1.65 74.88 303.15 19.26 108.37
2 2426 12.86 275.09 883.20 64.75 197.96 2 69817 2.36 66.80 266.24 18.37 110.05
3 1011 32.19 718.66 1918.67 146.67 365.19 3 41383 2.99 99.10 393.95 26.87 143.45
4 574 56.39 695.59 2095.46 194.56 553.24 4 28949 3.36 119.62 427.99 32.91 286.96
5 356 104.86 1776.10 5249.53 417.94 1474.96 5 21055 3.08 132.93 454.18 32.42 187.86
14-Sep
executed limit orders cancelled limit orders
executed limit orders cancelled limit orders
executed limit orders cancelled limit orders
executed limit orders cancelled limit orders
executed limit orders cancelled limit orders8-Sep
9-Sep
10-Sep
13-Sep
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A2. Natural log of lifetime 
 
Note: Only estimation results for the 8th of September are shown due to space 
constraints. The results for the remaining four days are readily available upon request. 
lifetime ln(lifetime)
Δpriority(DEPTH) -7.03*** -0.002***
(0.98) (0.001)
Δpriority(GAP) 40.34** 0.246***
(18.57) (0.010)
Gap 40.02*** 0.121***
(2.59) (0.001)
Vol 5.16** 0.003
(2.18) (0.002)
Δpriority(Depth) interacted with
GAP 0.09 -0.00091***
(0.13) (0.00008)
VOL 0.89*** 0.00057***
(0.26) (0.00017)
DEPTH 0.00*** 0.00000***
(0.00) (0.00000)
CALM 0.18* 0.00016***
(0.09) (0.00002)
Δpriority(Gap) interacted with
GAP 4.09*** -0.012***
(0.92) (0.001)
VOL 10.44*** 0.009***
(2.34) (0.001)
DEPTH -0.10* 0.000***
(0.06) (0.000)
CALM 1.77*** 0.001***
(0.24) (0.000)
constant -46.93*** 2.335***
(7.83) (0.005)
R2 0.37 0.12
NOB 257,215 257,215
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A3. Tobit regression 
 
Note: F stat. denotes F statistics with degree of freedom as the number of coefficient 
(NOC) and NOB minus NOC, which tests the null hypothesis that all regressors are 
statistically insignificant. Only estimation results for the 8th of September are shown due 
to space constraints. The results for the remaining four days are readily available upon 
request. 
OLS Tobit
Δpriority(DEPTH) -5.63*** -4.06***
(0.92) (0.90)
Δpriority(GAP) 32.83* 60.43***
(17.62) (18.06)
Gap 23.73*** 38.30***
(1.48) (2.15)
Vol 4.23** 2.17
(1.98) (2.34)
Δpriority(Depth) interacted with
GAP 0.09 -0.02
(0.13) (0.13)
VOL 0.64*** 0.73***
(0.23) (0.20)
DEPTH 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
CALM 0.18* 0.18**
(0.09) (0.09)
Δpriority(Gap) interacted with
GAP 4.54*** 3.10***
(0.89) (0.90)
VOL 8.95*** 9.98***
(1.93) (1.93)
DEPTH -0.09 -0.11*
(0.06) (0.06)
CALM 1.83*** 1.85***
(0.25) (0.24)
constant -25.32*** -275.45***
(4.39) (14.53)
R2 0.34
F stat. 99.56 133.10
NOB 491,088 491,088
